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O. K. BUROS, (ed.). The Fourth Mental Measurements Yearbook. Highland Park, New 
Jersey: The Gryphon Press, 1953, pp. 1163 ~ xxiii, $18. 
The Fourth Mental Measurements Yearbook follows the same plan as its predecessor, 
The Third Menial Measurements Yearbook, and, like it, is intended to supplement, rather 
than supplant, previous volumes of the series. The two main sections of the book are the 
Tests and Reviews section, with 830 entries, and the Books and Reviews section, with 429 
entries. Other useful features are a list of contributing reviewers, a periodical directory 
and index, a publishers directory and index, an index of titles, an index of names, and a 
classified index of tests. 
The eight objectives stated by the Editor for the Tests and Reviews section might be 
characterized in terms of three general purposes: 
I. To provide a bibliography of published tests and research which has been done 
on them; 
2. To give test users valuable information about specific tests; 
3. To exert an influence toward improving the quality of tests. 
The above ordering seems to this reviewer to be that  of the extent to which the objectives 
have been attained. As stated in the preface: "The yearbook attempts to list all commercially 
available tests---educational, psychoIogical, and vocational--published as separates in 
English-speaking countries in the four-year period 1948-1951. The commercially available 
tests also include older tests selected for review and tests published during the nineteen- 
year period (1933-1951) covered by this series of yearbooks and bibliographies but  not 
previously listed." A new feature of this volume is the listing (but only rarely the reviewing) 
of tests which are available only through certain restricted sources, such as: Association of 
American Medical Colleges, College Entrance Examination Board, Educational Testing 
Service, Life Insurance Agency Management Association, National League of Nursing 
Education, and Psychological Corporation. 
The bibliography of publications related to the various tests contains a total of 4,417 
titles and the at tempt  has been made to include all references published and unpublished 
"on the construction, validity, use, and limitations of each test • • ." through 1951. This 
bibliography certainly constitutes an invaluable source of information for anyone planning 
extensive work with any test on which research findings are available. 
For each t a t  listed there is given, in addition to title, author, and publisher, a de- 
scription of the groups for which the test is intended; copyright or publication date; what 
part scores, if any, are obtained from it; whether the test is an individual or a group test; 
whether it  is machine scorable; cost (as of early 1952); and working time and total t ime 
required. If data on reliability and validity are absent from the manual, this fact is mentioned 
also. 
The distribution of the entries in the Tests and Reviews section over the various 
content fields, and the incidence of reviews for them, are shown in Table 1. Inasmuch as 
there are 277 items which are not reviewed either in the Fourth Yearbook or in previous books 
in the series, it seems pertinent to make the suggestion that information about how the test 
was standardized and validated and some quantitative statement of its reliability and 
validity should be included in the descriptive material provided by the Editor. This is 
information which every test user should want to have anyway, and it is in fact omitted 
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The reviews vary in quality, some of them being thorough and factually-oriented 
discussions of points of importance to test users, while others are principally expressions of 
opinions based on the reviewers' study of the content of the items of the tests. In some 
cases, usually tests which have been reviewed in previous volumes of the series, only certain 
aspects of the tests are considered. This circumstance points up what seems to this reviewer 
to be a serious obstacle in the use of the book: For many teats, evaluation by a prospective 
user requires reference to two, or even more~ of the volumes in the series. I t  is to be hoped 
that  in subsequent Yearbooks, Burns may find i t  possible to consolidate all the reviews 
which have currency, so that  reference to but  one source is necessary. 
Despite the variability in quality just referred to, the reviews are on the whole service- 
able and in many instances furnish the kind of information relative to applications and 
limitations of the tests which may go far toward preventing their misuse. Qui~e a number 
of reviews are so adversely critical (and justifiably so) that  i t  is hard to believe that  the 
tests in question will receive enough support to justify their publication, if the M ~ t a /  
Measurements Yearbooks have any influence at all. 
The second main section of the Yearbook, Books and Reviews, includes 429 titles, 141 
of which are reviewed. To quote from the preface: "An at tempt  has been made to list all 
measurements books published in English-speaking countries in the four-year period 
1948-1951. In addition, a few older books are listed when accompanied by review excerpts 
not previously published in this series . . . .  Books on statistical methods in education and 
psychology published in the eleven-year period 1941-1951 are included but without ac- 
companying reviews. Instead, cross references are given to reviews in Statistical Methodology 
Reviews, 19~1-1950." 
Buros is quite frank in expressing his concern over the prospect that  i t  may not be 
possible to publish subsequent Yearbooks unless the ~ l e  of the Fourth makes the venture 
a good financial risk. I t  is difficult to see how the market can be greatly expanded if each 
new volume requires for its full utilization the availability of previous Yearbooks in the 
series. Perhaps the solution to the problem may be in the adoption of some kind of loose- 
leaf format, so that  additional reviews of a test could be inserted next to the original ones 
for that  test. Such an arrangement would also permit the establishment of a continuing 
review service, so that  critical reviews of tests could be made available as the tests them- 
selves appeared or as new findings about their uses were brought out. I t  would indeed be 
regrettable if this valuable service which Buros is performing should have to be discontinued. 
University of Michigan John E. Milholland 
HANS RmCH~.NBACm The Rise of Scientific Philosophy. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1951, pp. xi. + 333. 
Those who have even a slight acquaintance with contemporary academic philosophy 
are aware of the movement  or school which is variously called Logical Positivism or Logical 
Empiricism. I t  had its beginnings in Vienna and Berlin during the middle twenties, and 
its influence spread quickly. Largely as a result of European political changes during the 
past two decades, most of the surviving leaders of its early period are settled now in the 
United States. Hans Reichenbach, author of The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, was one of 
the earliest members of the Logical Empiricist group in Berlin, and is now Professor of 
Philosophy in the University of California at ~ Angeles. His book is the first to present 
a popular exposition of the new philSsophy, which is said by the author to be itself a science. 
The Preface asserts that, " . . . this book is written with the intention of showin$ that  
philosophy has proceeded from speculation to science." (p. vii). 
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Reichenbach's book is divided into two parts, the first, occupying one-third of the 
book, is headed "The Roots of Speculative Philosophy," and takes up the first six chapters. 
The second part consists of twelve chapters and occupies two-thirds of the book, being 
headed "The Results of Scientific Philosophy." The first part is devoted to an extended 
condemnation of the vast bulk of traditional philosophy. Traditional philosophies are 
divided by Reichenbach into just two camps, which he calls rationalism and empiricism. 
The first is condemned for its belief that factual knowledge can be obtained from sources 
other than sense perception. The second is criticized somewhat more mildly for its failure 
to agree that certainty is not a criterion for knowledge, and that so-called certain knowledge, 
like pure mathematics, for example, is not factual Their belief in the possibility of achieving 
a priori knowledge which is factual or synthetic led rationalist philosophers, we are told, to 
the construction of theories which provide only pseudo-explanations for the problems with 
which they were concerned. And the failure of older empirical philosophers to recognize 
that probability rather than certainty is all that knowledge need possess is what led them 
into the wasteland of barren scepticism, like Hume. Reichenbach's criticism is only partly 
devoted to refutation, however. For the most part he is interested more in the psychological 
basis of the older philosophies than in their logical shortcomings. Here, as in Dewey, the 
"quest for certainty" is the villain. 
The second part of the book is more constructive, although in every case the author 
repeats his claim that progress could be made only after the synthetic a priori was abandoned 
and the demand for certainty was relinquished in favor of probability. Here Reiehenbach 
discusses such varied topics as the nature of geometry, the philosophy of time, causality, 
the atomic theory, evolution, and what he calls "the functional conception of knowledge." 
His treatment of many of these topics is illuminating and very readable, much in the 
tradition of Eddington and Gamow. Reichenbach's discussion of geometry covers familiar 
ground, for the most part, describing briefly how earlier empirical rules of thumb were 
codified into a deductive system by Euclid, and then describing modern developments at 
somewhat greater length. The modern view, developed subsequent to the introduction of 
non-euclidean geometries, is that one axiomatic system is as "good" as another, regarded 
merely as mathematics, but that the question of the nature of real or physical space is an 
empirical question for the physicist to determine by observation or experiment. Some 
stimulating remarks are made in criticism of the "conventionalist" doctrine of Poincare, 
but the argument is not carried far enough to be completely convincing. 
Included also is a longish chapter on ethics, in which Reichenbach accepts without 
criticism the view of C. L. Stevenson that so-ealled moral judgments are neither true nor 
false, being what he calls "volitional decisions" rather than propositions or assertions proper. 
An interesting feature of Reichenbach's book is the parallel treatment he gives to the 
history of philosophy and the history of science. The last chapter of Part One is on classical 
physics, and several chapters in Part Two are more concerned with the development of 
modern science itself than with philosophy. The account is valuable in showing the influence 
of scientific progress on philosophizing--the "old" as well as the "new" philosophy was 
subject to this influence. Of course the parallel treatment is not merely an expository 
device, but an essential part of Reichenbach's argument to the effect that the significan~ 
questions considered by the older philosophers were of such a nature that they could only 
be answered by science itself, not by philosophy. 
What then is the proper task and the appropriate method of philosophy? According 
to Reichenbach, "I t  is the clarification of meanings through logical analys is . . . "  (p. 145), 
that is, "Philosophy is logical analysis . . ." (p. 308). Since it is Reichenbach's view that 
"Lo~c formulates rules of l anguage . . . "  (p. 222) logic and philosophy seem to have much 
in common with, perhaps even reduce to lexicography and grammar, which are the tra- 
ditional disciplines dealing with the correct use of words and their meanings. But far more 
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interesting conclusions are drawn by Reichenbach than by any grammarian. For example, 
"The  question of the existence of the mind is a matter of the correct use of words but  not a 
question of facts?'  (p. 272). And again, "There is the que~tion of the existence of the ex- 
ternal w o r l d . . . ,  which is found to be a question of correct use of l a n g u a g e . . . "  (p. 307). 
These quotations should serve to indicate that Reichenbach has in mind some criterion 
for " the correct use of words" other than the facts, including, presumably, the facts of 
language usage, to which mere lexicographers and grammarians are bound. Not even a 
hint is given, however, of what these criteria consist. 
The author's conception of analysis is not altogether clear. When a scientist speaks 
of analysing his data, what he usually has in mind is the formulation of some hypothesis or 
theory which will account for or explain the observed facts. In this sense of analysis, how- 
ever, i t  is the traditional method of philosophizing used by the great philosophers from 
Plato through Whitehead. The classical philosophers, of course, "taking all knowledge for 
their province," sought to formulate very general theories to account for data not lying 
wholly within the scope of any of the special sciences. Since Reichenbach wishes to dis- 
tinguish sharply between his own and the traditional conception of philosophy, he must 
have some other sense of "analysis" in nfind. But the reviewer is unable to discover what 
this new sense of "analysis" might be. 
Professional psychologists who read this book will be somewhat taken aback to be 
told that  " . . .  the human m i n d . . ,  is essentially passive in the act of perception." (p. 66). 
And they will perhaps be puzzled as to how to go about fulfilling the new tasks assigned 
them by Reichenbach, for example " . . .  predetermination through fate is a conception to 
be explained by p s y c h o l o g y . . . "  (p. 105). Some of Reiehenbach's "demonstrations" strike 
this reviewer as being somewhat less than convincing. Consider, for example, the following: 
"The mind is inseparable from a certain state of bodily organization. I t  follows that mind 
and bodily organization of a certain kind are the same thing." (pp. 271-2). This argument 
introduces a new principle, which we might dub "the identity of indivisibles." We might 
as well argue that since Damon and Pythias are inseparable, they are therefore "the same 
thing," which does not seem to be very logical, and yet  follows the same pattern as Reichen- 
bach's own argument. 
I t  should be remarked, moreover, that  many doctrines which Reichenbach presents as 
though they were universally accepted results of positivistic philosophy would find few 
adherents even from the ranks of other Logical Empiricists. His remarks on probability 
theory, for example, have been presented and argued for by him in numerous publications 
in the past, and yet they seem to have won but  little acceptance. The situation is similar 
with respect to his claims for the utility of many-valued logics in quantum theory. 
I t  is regrettable that  Reiehenbach felt obliged to refute all previous philosophers 
before presenting his own views, because some of his refutations seem to fall far wide of 
their marks. Reichenbach suggests that  had non-euclidean geometries been discovered 
earlier, "Plato 's  doctrine of ideas would have been abandoned as lacking its basis in geo- 
metrical knowledge." (p. 142). Yet Platonic or mathematical realism is strongly defended 
by such mathematicians and logicians as Frege and GOiel, who presumably were at  least 
as well acquainted with non-euclidean geometries as Reiehenbach himself. And to say 
that  the philosopher Berkeley was a solipsist is as much a historical error as it  is a philo- 
sophical one to say that  he refuted his own solipsism by writing books; but  Reichenbach 
says both these things (p. 267). 
Yet despite its shortcomings in matters of detail, Reichenbach's book is a provocative 
and forceful argument for a very important contemporary philosophical position. 
University of Michigan Irving M. Copi 
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W. Ross ASHBY. Desicn$or a brain. New York: Wiley & Sons, 1952, pp. ix ~- 260. 
The analogy is a device greatly admired by scientists. At  least there never seems to 
be a dearth of them. Sometimes the analogy provides momentary interest, but  quickly 
fades out  of popularity because of a lack of any real contribution to the advancement of 
science. At  other times the analogy becomes so useful as to assume the role of a precise 
theory or even a factual description of the area of knowledge analogized. 
The analogy has many possible uses in science. Sometimes it  serves only to clarify 
thinking about a problem by stating it  in terms more familiar to the scientist. At other 
times it  is used to provide a more exact description of the phenomena. (Such analogies 
usually are somewhat more mathematical than those used simply to put  a problem in a 
familiar setting.) At still other times, the analogy provides a means of extrapolating beyond 
the existing data, and of predicting the behavior of phenomena not already known. Probably 
the authors of all analogies hope that  this latter benefit will result. Time alone can tell 
whether the predictions are correct. 
Ashby has provided psychologists and physiologists with an analogy which attempts 
primarily to make more understandable some of the known phenomena of the behavior of 
living organisms. His analogy is basically mathematical, and thus stands the chance of 
providing a more exact description of behavior even if predictions made are not borne out by 
experimentation. I t  is not just mathematical, however, for one of Ashby's goals is to show 
that  complex behavior can be explained with purely mechanistic principles. Throughout 
the book he uses a physical device (the homeostat) to illustrate how various types of behavior 
exhibited by living organisms can be shown to exist in an inanimate object. 
More specifically, Ashby is concerned with showing that  adaptive behavior can be 
explained with purely mechanistic principles. Since adaptive behavior covers a lot of 
ground, however, and has often been described as the major distinguishing characteristic 
of animate objects, Ashby's concern is really quite broad. 
I t  is impossible to do full justice to the system described by Ashby in a short review. 
Its essential characteristics as seen by the reviewer are as follows, however: 
A system is any arbitrarily selected set of variables, and a variable is any measurable 
quantity which has a value at  any instant. The state of the system is simply the numerical 
values of the variables in the system at  a given instant. A line of behavior is the relation 
between variables. A phase-space shows the relation between two or more variables, neither 
of which is time. I t  thus shows the interrelations of these variables, regardless of time. 
For  example, hunger of an animal and speed of running down a straight runway might 
both be functions of time, and plots of each against time would be lines of behavior. A 
plot of hunger against speed of running, however, would constitute the phase-space. The 
field is the phase-space containing all lines of behavior from all possible initial states or 
starting points. Thus there  can be several curves showing the interrelation between hunger 
and speed of running, if these curves are all started with different initial states. 
In an absolute system, all lines of behavior following a given state are identical, regard- 
less of how the system got to that  particular state. Thus in an absolute system, two lines 
of behavior might have started from different states, and eventually ended up in the same 
state. If  this happens, the two lines of behavior are identical once they have been in that  
given state. This definition of the absolute system simply makes explicit the assumption of 
complete determinism of the behavior of the organism; for with complete determinism if 
we know the state at a given instant we can completely predict the future course of action. 
If the system is not absolute, then we can have a state followed by two or more different 
lines of behavior, with its consequent lack of complete determinism. 
The lines of behavior, or the system, can either be stable or unstable. They are stable 
if they never leave a region of the phase-space. In this connection systems with feedback 
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become important, for such systems usually produce stable lines of behavior. Actually, it 
is only true that systems with negative feedback produce stable lines of behavior. With 
positive feedback the system becomes very unstable. In a system with negative feedback, 
all variables are interconnected in such a way that a change in one will produce a change in 
the others. Thus if the system is in a stable state, if one variable is changed, another variable 
is affected in such a way that it quickly brings the value of the first variable back to its 
stable-state value. 
Ashby postulates that adaptive behavior leads to physiological stability, or keeps all 
relevant variables within physiological limits. Now the question becomes: What kind of 
mechanism will ensure that stable systems will result when the conditions to which the 
system are subjected are as many and varied as those encountered by animate organisms? 
The principle of ultrastability is used to take care of this problem. An ultrastable system 
is one which has the possibilities of stable lines of behavior, and which furthermore seeks 
those fields which have stable lines of behavior. Such a system can be produced if a step- 
function variable is introduced which interacts with the main variables of the field. The 
essential purpose of the step-function is that  i t  provides a constantly changing parameter 
which determines the phase-space of the main variables. If  the step-function interacts with 
the main variables in such a way that  if the stable lines of behavior do not result, the step- 
function changes value, then the system will continue to change fields until a stable system 
results. (Actually, the step-function can be thought of as simply another variable in the 
field, which now has one more dimension. Furthermore, such a variable does not really have 
to be a step-function. We could simple say that  only one field exists, that this field has a 
stable region, and that all lines of behavior converge to this stable region. However, i t  
probably does make it  easier to think of one of these variables as a step-function which acts 
as a parameter to change the field.) 
Such a system will explain adaptive behavior at  an elementary level. The problem 
becomes more difficult, however, when we take into consideration the fact that  if a stable 
state is reached, and then the environment is changed and another stable state is reached, 
the first stable state can be shown to still be in existence. To take care of such problems, the 
system is made more complicated, and a multistable system is used. The multistable 
system is composed of many smaller ultrastable systems which are connected together by 
main variables. In such a system, one sub-system could reach a stable level, and this fact 
would then allow another sub-system to reach its stable level without changing the stable 
field of the first system. Obviously this sort of thing could be built up indefinitely to take 
care of problems of greater and greater complexity. 
In very elementary form, these are the ideas that  Ashby presents. They- are contained 
in his first 18 chapters. An appendix contains six more chapters which treat the problem 
in more rigorous mathematical form. 
I t  is extremely difficult to evaluate such a proposed system. Certainly there are some 
very interesting concepts here. On the other hand there are some severe deficiencies which 
will undoubtedly limit the usefulness of the system. For example, this way of thinking does 
not explain the role of reward in learDJng very well. Punishment is easily handled, because 
the effect of punishment is to throw the ultrastable system out of balance, forcing it to 
seek a new value of the step-function which will produce a stable line of behavior. Reward 
could probably best be handled with a Guthrian bias. Its role would be to prevent the 
operation of variables which might throw the system out  of balance, thus making it  seek 
values on the step-function which produce unstable fields if a stable one has been found. 
However, there is too much evidence that  reward plays a much broader role than this in 
increasing the probability that a particular behavior will occur in ~t given situation again. 
Probably a more serious problem than this, though, is the difficulty of handling 
problems of increasing complexity. For example, if a single ultrastable system is operating, 
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all learning should be insightful (i.e., sudden). But all learning is not in fact insightful. 
The use of the multistable system partly takes care of such problems, by providing for 
a series of sub-learnings each of which could be insightful in turn. Essentially, however, 
with such a system we would be driven ultimately to a series of step-functions of step- 
functions. I t  would not .t~ke much regression of this sort to produce a completely statistical 
description of adaptive behavior, but by this time the value of the particular system used 
to predict the statistics would be greatly lost because of its cumbersomeness. 
A third difficulty, in some ways not really important, is the fairly complete lack of 
supporting evidence at  the neural level. If  the system's purpose is only to describe in an 
analogous way the behavior of the entire organism, this difficulty is of little concern. How- 
ever, the chance that  the system describes the way things really are is decreased by this 
lack of evidence. 
All in all, the reviewer is fairly pessimistic that  Design for a Brain will have greatly 
advanced psychology in either a few years or many years. Systems such as this simply do 
not provide a framework in which to put  the known facts of complex adaptive behavior. 
In many ways one has the feeling that  the mathematical model simply describes what we 
already know to be true, but  that  the description holds only if we confine ourselves to 
relatively simple examples. I t  does not really explain anything. Perhaps this feeling on the 
part  of the reviewer is due to the fact tha t  he already accepts the hypothesis tha t  adaptive 
behavior is deterministic, and thus needs no proof that  it can be, particularly when the 
proof is for behavior much simpler than that  already assumed to be mechanistic. I t  seems 
as unnecessary to demonstrate that  behavior commonly observed in animate objects can 
occur in inanimate objects as it does to demonstate the converse. Probably psychology will 
advance faster by a concerted effort to determine the lawful relations among the variables 
we find. Unless we already assume that  they are lawful, there is little point in searching for 
them. So what have we gained by demonstrating that  they can be lawful--in the de- 
terministic sense? 
Regardless of this feeling that  this analogy (and other similar analogies) do not really 
advance the science of psychology, there is much to be gained from a reading of the book. 
Ashby has been as exact as possible in his developments, and at several places has made 
quite explicit assumptions which are implicitly made by scientists in their work. His chapter 
on dynamic systems is very good reading, and provides a set of definitions which would 
be profitabIe reading for most psychologists. Also, his chapter on the animal as a machine 
is good for his clear statement of a way of thinking about organisms in environments. 
Perhaps the best way of summarizing the value of such a book is to say that  as a 
particular system which explains how adaptive behavior comes about, it is probably not 
going to be of lasting interest. If, however, we want a very clear statement of what  we 
mean when we say that  adaptive behavior is deterministic or mechanistic, then this book 
provides a very clear and exact statement of that  meaning. Perhaps this was the author's 
real intent. If  so, then he has succeeded. If his intent was really to do more than that, he 
probably has not. 
Johns Hopkins University IV. R. Garner 
